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The gender pay gap – that is, the difference in wages between men and women for the same or 
substantially the same work, or work of equal value – still features prominently as a stumbling block 
in achieving South African gender equality. If South Africa is to dislodge its stagnant gender pay gap, 
especially for women in the middle and upper levels of the wage distribution, pay transparency – making 
gender differences in wages known to employees, government and the public – can compel employers to 
remunerate fairly and equally. We undertook a comparison between the global and national mechanisms of 
gender pay transparency to propose a way forward to increase transparency in gender pay for South Africa. 
In addition to a discussion of existing mechanisms, a summary of the gender pay transparency mechanisms 
of 16 countries is provided as supplementary material to the article. We found that South Africa could 
strengthen legislated transparency mechanisms, especially with regard to pay reporting and pay audits, 
provided that sanctions are attached to non-delivery of these duties. Reigniting the debate on strengthening 
and improving South African legislation and interpretation of existing governance codes in relation to the 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement of gender pay transparency mechanisms could strengthen 
the existing collective bargaining framework and provide the impetus to demonstrate that South Africa 
sees gender equality as an achievable reality, not an improbable ideology. 
Significance:
• Despite the presence of constitutional rights and enabling legislation to prevent workplace gender 
discrimination, South Africa continues to see a stagnant median gender pay gap of between 23% and 35%. 
• This study provides a global analysis to reinvigorate the debate on how South Africa can strengthen 
transparency mechanisms to close the gender pay gap. 
• Legislators, activists, board members, trade unions, academics, and organisational leaders are provided 
with suggestions on transparency mechanisms to improve efforts towards economic gender equality 
for South Africa.
Introduction
We consider how transparent mandatory gender pay or wage gap mechanisms, as implemented around the globe, 
could inform future directions in closing the gap in South Africa. The gender pay gap relates to differences in wage 
earnings between women and men, and is evident at two levels: (1) job-specific gaps (or job and occupational 
families), in which equal pay for the same or similar jobs, or jobs of equal value is determined, and (2) at the 
aggregated level, where organisational, industry/sector or national data, over time, show wage gap patterns between 
women and men. 
A recent study by Mosomi1, utilising 23 years’ South African aggregated labour force panel data over a period ending 
2015, confirms that the median gender pay gap was stubbornly stagnant in this period after controlling for level of 
education, amongst other relevant characteristics. More recently, the International Labour Organization (ILO) reported 
that, in 2017, the median gap was 28.8% based on hourly wages, and 30.3% based on monthly earnings.2 These 
statistics show South Africa to be performing poorly in addressing the gap, given that the average global gap is 
approximately 20%.2 Mosomi’s study also provides varied results for labour force participation at, especially, the 
lower and upper ends of the wage distribution. At the 10th percentile, the gap has narrowed, which may be a result of 
collective bargaining3 and the introduction of national minimum wages1 for those in the lowest-paying and vulnerable 
jobs. At the 90th percentile, the wage gap for women at the executive level of organisations initially seemed to be 
closing, but, in the last 10 years of the Mosomi data set, the gender wage gap widened, and is continually increasing 
for these women. With the exception of employers that utilise standardised wages, such as in the public sector, where 
a small but definite gap remains, the South African gender pay gap continues to be problematic.
Whilst South Africa could be regarded as a champion of gender equality in Africa (with a first-place ranking on the 
Africa Gender Equality Index4 and the 19th place globally amongst 149 countries on the Gender Gap Index5), it is in 
the details that the picture regarding South African women’s economic empowerment is troubling. When turning to 
household composition, we start understanding why South Africa’s gender wage gap as a factor in gender equality 
issues is especially deserving of attention.
It is estimated that 37.9% of South African households are headed by women6, female-headed households are 
approximately 40% poorer than those headed by men7, and 48.2% of female-headed households support extended 
family members, in comparison to 23.1% of male-headed households doing the same8. Women prioritise spending 
on household and parenting responsibilities, and they have a longer life expectancy than men.9 Because women in 
South Africa support many children and extended family members, and are more likely than men to be employed 
in occupations with the lowest wages10, ‘finding a man and then sticking to him, is often as much a matter of 
economic necessity as it is a romantic choice’11. It is in economic dependency that power relations are skewed in 
favour of men, where domestic violence, which is alarmingly high in South Africa12, may occur and be perpetuated. 
Beyond household structure, the shaping of women’s identities regarding their societal worth and contribution, as 
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well as their access to resources to improve their own and others’ lives, 
makes the attainment of pay parity significant.
In South Africa, the private sector labour market is largely market-driven.13 
When there is greater reliance on the market, the impact of pay distortions 
may be increased, as the inherent role of transparent criteria, as enforced 
through regulatory rules, is reduced, instead favouring subjective criteria.13
Wage transparency constitutes what is known to others14 about 
wages, beyond what is known to the employer. Given that ‘policies and 
measures to reduce gender pay gaps…need constant monitoring and 
reinforcement’15, we set out to do a comparison between the global and 
national mechanisms of gender pay transparency, to propose a way 
forward to increase transparency in gender pay for South Africa. 
Method
Data sampling, collection and analysis
This study was based on publicly available data on the Internet in 
English. Data constitute digital literature found on webpages and in 
reports and documents collected from websites of legislative and 
governance bodies, utilising the keywords ‘gender pay gap public 
reporting’ and ‘gender pay gap transparency’. Two main documents 
provided the springboard for specific country research: the 2018 DLA 
Piper Report16 and the 2017 European Commission Report17. The 16 
countries (excluding South Africa) selected to form part of this study had 
some form of legislated gender wage transparency obligation allocated 
to employers operating in those countries. The countries are: Canada 
(federal), Australia (Commonwealth), Scandinavian countries, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and countries identified by the European Commission 
(EC) of the European Union (EU) as having implemented a form of gender 
wage gap reporting in terms of its 2014 Recommendation.18 Although 
‘great accuracy cannot compensate for inaccessibility’19, we attempted 
to mitigate the possibility of missing important country data by doing an 
additional Internet keyword search using the words “gender pay gap” 
OR “gender wage gap” AND the name of each of the 192 countries that 
are recognised by the United Nations as member states20. Country-level 
data are provided in Supplementary tables 1–3. India, Peru and Japan 
were added to the country data as Supplementary table 3, as they have 
initiated equality reporting measures. The United States of America does 
not feature in this comparison, because, despite plans to introduce a 
reporting mechanism, the Trump presidency has put these plans on the 
back burner.16 In addition, we consulted library databases ISAP Sabinet, 
Jutastat and SA ePublications to supplement our Internet searches.
Ethics and permission
‘Manual, nonautomated access of information on publicly available 
web pages should be acceptable without special permissions or 
actions’21(p.607). Ethical approval to conduct the study was sought, and 
the study was exempted by the University of Stellenbosch Business 
School (USB-2019-10369).
Results
Countries in South America (other than Peru), Africa (other than 
South Africa), and Asia (other than India and Japan) do not have 
mandatory reporting obligations22 – which is most likely a reflection of 
various aspects relating to development, including under-developed formal 
labour markets and a poor track record of gender rights23,24. 
Process of implementation
The implementation of the reporting mechanisms has been found to 
take one of two forms: (1) blanket implementation by all qualifying 
companies, regardless of size, from the date imposed by law, or 
(2) a phased implementation in which different dates for compliance are 
set for qualifying entities, depending on the number of their employees and 
whether the employer is a state entity, or in which different dates are set 
for degrees of compliance.
Qualifying employers
The selection of qualifying employers determines the scope of the 
implementation of gender pay enforcement mechanisms, i.e. it is the 
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nature of the selection that determines how much of the workforce 
is included in the mechanism’s ambit. Both the size of the employer 
in terms of number of employees in its workforce and whether the 
employer is public or private were used as qualifying criteria in the 
countries included in this research. The workforce size requirement is 
as few as 10 employees in Sweden, and as many as 500 employees in 
Germany. However, if the countries are looked at in terms of workforce 
size, it appears that those with smaller workforces (e.g. Sweden, Iceland, 
Denmark and Finland) have lower thresholds for implementation of the 
mechanisms that apply. There are exceptions, such as France, which has 
a workforce comparable to that of the UK and Germany, but has a low 
threshold of 50 employees. However, as a general rule, countries with 
larger workforces have higher thresholds, e.g. the UK (250 or more), 
Australia (100 or more) and Germany (500 or more). The rationale behind 
a higher threshold is to prevent smaller employers from being burdened 
with expensive and time-consuming reporting that may not have much 
influence on the gender pay gap17, while lower thresholds are aimed at 
covering a greater proportion of the workforce. Some countries with lower 
thresholds have instituted a phased implementation, from larger to smaller 
employers, presumably to allow smaller employers more time to comply 
with the requirements. Most countries do not differentiate between public 
and private employers. However, Austria and Australia limit compliance to 
the private sector. One reason for this differentiation could be pre-existing 
reporting mechanisms, such as detailed annual reports, and collective 
bargaining. Another factor to consider is that legislation may specifically 
protect private sector pay information under data-protection and privacy 
laws.25 In such cases, employers are prohibited from releasing pay 
information, and employees have no legal duty to do so.25 The third part 
of this requirement is the existence of other qualifying criteria besides the 
above two, e.g. an obligation to publish management reports (Germany), 
being subject to federal regulation of employment matters or a federal 
contractor (Canada), or companies not being required to prepare annual 
reports (Norway). The overarching rationale for additional criteria would be 
to include certain types of companies in the mechanisms, e.g., in Canada, 
the federal government ensures that all companies with which it contracts 
are compliant with the mechanisms, while, in Germany, only certain types 
of companies have to produce management reports that enable deeper 
analysis of the operations of the company. 
Reporting as a transparency mechanism 
The use of a gender pay report was compared in the form of reporting 
with which qualifying employers must comply (report, survey, audit, 
etc.), the reporting period, and to whom the report must be provided. 
In France, employers only have to publish information on the size of 
the gender pay gap on their website. In Denmark, reporting takes the 
form of information submitted to Statistics Denmark; the data are then 
gender-segregated and returned to the employer, and employees also 
have access to this information. Finland uses an equality plan that is 
made available to employees, while Iceland requires certification of 
compliance with an Icelandic Standard with regard to the gender wage 
gap. By comparison, in India, companies are mandated to compile 
a register of employee data, including, inter alia, the number of men 
and women employed, their remuneration, and a breakdown of the 
components of remuneration, but there is no obligation to report this 
information. Similarly, Peru has, since 2017, required that companies 
compile detailed tables of employee categories and functions, including 
salary information. Finally, in Japan, companies must perform research 
on the gender pay gap and submit an action plan based on that research, 
which details how they will address the pay gap.
In terms of the frequency of using the reporting mechanisms, 2 of the 
16 countries under study require reporting every 3 years, 7 require 
annual reporting, and 4 require biannual reporting. Of the remaining 
three countries, two do not have reporting requirements, and the last 
country only requires that a once-off plan be reported. While increased 
frequency has the disadvantage of increased administration to collect 
the required data, it is beneficial in ensuring that equitable gender pay 
practices are upheld. 
Another important consideration in the present study was the target of 
the reporting mechanism, that is, whether it is internal or external to the 
3 Volume 116| Number 3/4 March/April 2020
Research Article
https://doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2020/6772
organisation. Internal transparency relates to information available to an 
organisation’s employees within the organisational system. External 
transparency may serve various audiences, namely trade unions, 
regulatory bodies such as government, and the public. It was found that 
six countries require some form of external reporting, such as on the 
organisation’s or public institution’s website, or in the federal gazette. In four 
countries, the information is only available to local union representatives 
or the employer’s works council. In Finland, the information need only be 
communicated to employees. In Austria, if there is no works council, the 
information must be made available directly to employees. However, in 
Peru and India, the information need not be communicated at all, but must 
be available for inspection by the appropriate authorities.
Indicators or measures used in different countries
What is actually reported on is crucial to understanding the nature of 
the gender wage gap in a particular country. The gap may be present 
in only certain occupational levels or industries, or within different 
components of the remuneration package. Identifying the source of the 
gap in a given employer’s remuneration is key to formulating a response 
to reduce it. One common measure reported on is the gender pay 
equity objectives and policies in place at the employer. This measure is 
usually coupled with an analysis of the effects or results of such policies 
(Australia, Germany, Norway). Other countries have to report on the 
actual remuneration and bonuses paid to male and female employees, 
as performance bonuses and variable pay may contribute to the gender 
wage gap to a greater extent than base pay.15 Another indicator is the 
number of men and women in each occupational level, which illustrates 
the distribution of men to women among the various jobs at an employer, 
or among different industries in a country, e.g. more women in health 
care and more men in mining. Australia has the additional requirement 
that each employer report on whether a remuneration gap analysis has 
been performed. This requirement encourages the employer to take a 
proactive stance in identifying and remedying internal gender wage gaps 
using internal statistics and data within the entity and to try to resolve 
any gaps identified before outside forces compel them to do so.
Penalties for non-compliance
Penalties for non-compliance should be sufficiently significant to be a 
deterrent. Non-compliance can refer to not reporting or to non-compliance 
with the obligation to pay women the same as men for work of equal value 
or the same work. The countries under study were found to have different 
approaches in this regard, ranging from no sanctions to public naming and 
shaming and financial penalties. In Australia and the UK, legislation does 
not provide for any sanction. In Australia, non-compliant employers could 
be named and shamed by the Workplace Gender Equality Agency, and the 
employer could be precluded from government tenders. In Sweden, an 
employee who is paid less than a comparable employee can raise a claim 
for equal payment. In Germany, failure to file the required gender equality 
report could be considered tantamount to not having filed an annual 
report, which could, but probably will not, lead to a fine. Iceland, Belgium, 
Denmark and Canada provide for administrative fines in their legislation. 
Canada and Iceland fine organisations fixed amounts for not filing reports 
or failure to obtain certification, while Belgian legislation provides for fines 
of variable amounts, depending on the number of employees affected by 
the non-compliance.
Mechanisms currently used in South Africa
The Constitution
The foundation of South African law is the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa of 1996 (the Constitution).26(s1(c)) In Chapter 2, the Bill 
of Rights states that neither the state, nor any person, may unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on the grounds of, inter 
alia, gender or sex.26(s9(3),(4)) Furthermore, the state is obliged to enact 
national legislation ‘to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination’26(s9(4)). 
This obligation must be examined in light of South Africa’s ratification of 
the ILO’s Equal Remuneration Convention of 1951.27 
National legislation
In terms of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act (PEPUDA)28, which came into force on 15 January 2003, a complainant 
may allege a case of unfair discrimination, which, if based on any of the 
prohibited grounds listed in this Act, including gender, would necessitate the 
respondent proving that the discrimination was fair28(s13). If the complainant 
succeeds in her or his claim, the presiding officer of the Equality Court 
‘may make an appropriate order in the circumstances, including an award 
of damages in favour of the complainant or an order directing that specific 
steps be taken to stop the unfair discrimination’28(s21(2)). This is an after-the-
fact remedy, rather than a preventative measure, and is not limited to the 
workplace. However, the PEPUDA will only apply in instances in which the 
Employment Equity Act29 (EEA), discussed below, does not apply30. Thus, 
both Acts have circumscribed areas of application.
Section 28 of the PEPUDA identifies the duty and responsibility of all 
persons to eliminate gender discrimination and to promote equality.28(s28(3)
(a)) This responsibility must be carried out via audits, promulgating 
appropriate laws, developing progressive policies, implementing codes 
of good practice, and instituting viable action plans.28(s28(3)(b)) Finally, the 
Act contains a Schedule listing several practices occurring in different 
sectors ‘which are or may be unfair, that are widespread and that need 
to be addressed’28(s29(1)), ensuring that, in the appropriate circumstances, 
legislative and other measures are taken28(s29(2)). One of the practices 
identified in the ‘Labour and Employment’ section is ‘[f]ailing to respect 
the principle of equal pay for equal work’28(Sch1(1)(c)). Thus, the practice 
of not paying women equally to men for work of equal value has been 
identified as an unfair practice that the state has a duty to address. 
In support of addressing the EEA29, which came into force on 1 December 
1999, was amended on 1 August 2014. Specifically, Section 6(4) states 
that ‘[a] difference in terms and conditions of employment between 
employees of the same employer performing the same or substantially 
the same work or work of equal value that is directly or indirectly based 
on [gender], is unfair discrimination’29(s6(4)) – the position already taken 
by the Labour Court prior to these amendments31.
The Regulations to the EEA32 provide clarification on the definition of 
work of equal value, how to apply Section 6(4) of the EEA, and how 
to assess whether work is of equal value. Further to promoting gender 
wage equality, designated employers have a duty to submit an annual 
report (Form EEA2) to the Director General of the Department of Labour, 
including information regarding the workforce profile, numerical targets, 
and goals and skills development, but this information does not include 
employee pay information.29(s21(1))
The EEA defines a designated employer as: (1) a person employing at least 
50 employees; (2) a person employing fewer than 50 employees, where 
such person has a total annual turnover equal to or exceeding that of a 
small business in terms of Schedule 4; (3) a municipality; (4) an organ 
of state, but not the National Defence Force, National Intelligence Agency, 
or the South African Secret Service; and (5) an employer that has been 
appointed a designated employer in terms of the EEA by virtue of a 
collective agreement in terms of Section 23 or 31 of the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995.29(s1) A designated employer must also submit an Income 
Differential Statement (IDS – EEA4) that details the average remuneration 
and benefits received by employees on each occupational level of the 
employer’s workforce – segregated by gender, race, and nationality, which 
must be submitted to the Employment Conditions Commission (ECC)29(s27(1)), 
32(reg12(1)). Additionally, employers must provide remuneration details divided 
into fixed/guaranteed and variable portions of the highest paid employee 
in each subcategory of each occupational level, except at the lowest 
occupational level, where the remuneration amounts of the employee 
with the lowest total remuneration must be provided (Section D).32(EEA4) 
Thus, the actual data reported in this statement are a comparison of the 
total remuneration per occupational level in subcategories, and, as such 
the statement does not enable comparison of total remuneration of men 
to that of women for a given level. It only reports on subcategories, such 
as total remuneration of white women compared to that of African men. It 
is possible to derive those data from the statement, but it shows the more 
intersectional nature of the data that the Department of Labour is seeking. 
The section titled ‘Reasons for Income Differentials’ requires employers 
to identify the reasons for income differentials at each occupational 
level. However, the employer is not required to specify to which income 
differential(s) related to gender, race or nationality the reason(s) apply. 
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It must be noted that the EEA4 is not a public document, in contrast 
to the EEA2 form, which may be requested by the public from the 
Department of Labour.32(reg10(11)) However, during collective bargaining, 
the parties thereto may request the information contained in an IDS for 
the purpose of collective bargaining.
The purpose of an IDS is reflected in Section 27(2) of the EEA, being 
to determine whether there are ‘disproportionate’ income differentials, or 
whether there exists unfair discrimination in terms of Section 6(4).29(s27(2)) 
The EEA protects individual employees’ privacy by prohibiting the ECC 
from disclosing any identifying personal information.29(s27(5)) If an employer 
is found to have unfairly discriminated against an employee, the Labour 
Court has the power to award compensation to the employee, to direct 
the employer to take steps to prevent the same unfair discrimination or 
similar practice occurring in future, or to direct an ‘undesignated’ employer 
to comply with Chapter III of the EEA, including an order to provide an 
IDS.29(s50(2)) The court will probably order that the affected employee’s 
remuneration be increased to that of the comparator.33 Additionally, 
failure to submit the IDS could result in a fine being imposed on the 
employer.29(ss21(4B),27(1)) If the employer has had no previous contravention, 
the maximum fine that may be imposed is the greater of ZAR1 500 000 or 
2% of the employer’s turnover.29(sch1) The fine increases with the number of 
previous contraventions the employer has committed.29(sch1)
Governance codes
According to the King IV Report on Good Governance (2016), a 
company’s board must approve reports on and the implementation 
of its remuneration policy, which should reflect that ‘the organisation 
remunerates fairly, responsibly and transparently’34. The King IV Report 
is binding on companies listed on the JSE Limited.35(s3.84(c)) The policy 
and report must be tabled at the company’s annual general meeting for 
a separate, non-binding advisory vote by shareholders.35(s3.84(k)) If 25% or 
more of shareholders vote against either document, the company must 
invite dissenting shareholders to provide reasons for their vote.35(s3.84(k)) 
Additionally, the annual report must indicate the remuneration of the 
company’s directors.35(s8.62-3),36(ss30(4)-(6)) Therefore, gender is not specifically 
targeted in the JSE’s requirement for reporting of directors’ remuneration, 
which information could be used to determine the existence of a gender 
pay gap at director level.
Recommendations
Despite ILO Conventions No. 100 (Equal Remuneration) and No. 111 
(Discrimination: Employment and Occupation) having been in existence 
for over 60 years, the gender pay gap is still a concern in industrialised 
countries, and an even greater one in developing countries.5 Taking 
into consideration that ‘policies targeting the gender wage gap must be 
adjusted to account for the different experiences of women in different 
parts of the wage distribution’1 and the phased approach highlighted in 
the global comparison, we make the following recommendations.
The first requirement is the passing of laws at regional and national 
level that place a duty on employers to give men and women equal 
remuneration for the same or similar work, or work of equal value.25 
South Africa achieved this requirement with the implementation of 
Section 6(4) of the EEA. The criteria to determine designated employers, 
as stipulated in the EEA, follow global trends, reflecting appropriateness 
for the size of South Africa’s workforce. Inclusion of both public and 
private organisations in mandatory reporting aids identification of 
patterns in gender wage gaps, and could be used to formulate targeted 
policies to close the gap. However, the EEA addresses mainly pay 
discrimination at the individual job level, and addressing the issue 
through litigation is costly and intricate for affected individuals.
Whilst the IDS serves as a preliminary mechanism to flag inconsistencies 
regarding a number of intersectional wage differentials at aggregated level 
and the gender wage gap receives specific attention, the format of the 
data only enables national comparison in pre-determined occupational 
categories. Legislation specifying duties of employers and penalties 
for non-compliance, as seen in Belgium and Sweden37, is the preferred 
method to promote pay transparency and equality25, and it is in this area 
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that South Africa can improve. Specifically, the EC Recommendation18 
provides a benchmark of four mechanisms that South Africa could employ. 
The first mechanism is the strengthening of pay reports by further 
refining an annual reporting obligation on gender-segregated average 
remuneration for medium and large companies already targeted by 
the EEA. Supplementary tables 1–3 provide a description of various 
measures or indicators employed globally. A selection of indicators of the 
UK, Australia and Canada would provide the widest coverage of gender-
relevant aggregated data. Reports should be lodged with the ECC as a 
first step, with consideration to phasing in the publishing of company 
data more publicly in future, once implementation problems have been 
resolved. Reporting that is too generic, as is presently the case with the 
IDS in South Africa, conceals structural inequalities, leaving policymakers 
to apply a one-size-fits-all approach instead of targeted solutions. Data 
could remain anonymous through the inclusion of a criterion of a minimum 
number of employees per reporting category, e.g. there must be at least 
five employees at a specific level in order for that level to be reported on17. 
Whilst the complexities in reporting the annualised value of non-vested 
share incentive schemes are acknowledged (these are currently included 
in the IDS only as part of the variable remuneration figure), inclusion 
thereof in pay reports as a separate category of reporting is essential 
in identifying gender-based differences in performance-related pay, and 
should be phased in in the near future. A rapid gain could be made if the 
JSE expanded its interpretation of King IV’s stipulation that ‘the organisation 
remunerates fairly, responsibly and transparently’ by mandating gender 
gap reporting in annual reports, through the Listing Requirements, for all 
employees in the bottom, middle and top of the wage distribution of an 
organisation, including directors. Such gender-specific reporting covering 
the main infliction points in the wage distribution could inform targeted 
policies to close the gap in listed companies.
The EU recommendation that employers regularly communicate pay 
report information to employees or trade unions (or other representatives) 
is absent in South African legislation, and should be considered. The pay 
report mechanism will further be strengthened if the parties analyse such 
a pay report and raise queries regarding gender pay discrepancies. In this 
regard, employees should be educated in remuneration principles and 
practices in order to limit misinformed queries and ungrounded discontent 
and disputes. A pay report that specifically provides gender-segregated 
pay information could be used as a precursor to an employee’s right to 
request pay information. 
The second mechanism, an employee’s right to query another employee’s 
pay, could be problematic in South Africa, due to a person’s right to 
privacy and confidentiality26(s14), as also identified in the EC report. The EEA 
prohibits the ECC from disclosing any information pertaining to individual 
employees or employers, which would include details of the IDS.29(s27(5)) 
This restriction is especially pertinent where companies have very few 
employees in the respective occupational level or gender grouping.
Another consideration is that the Protection of Personal Information Act38 
(POPI) regulates the processing and distribution of personal information. 
However, the relevant sections of the POPI Act concerning employee 
information are not yet in force, and are thus not further discussed here.39 
With reference to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA)40, 
an employee may disclose his or her own remuneration40(s78(1)(b)),41. 
An employer may not contractually prohibit an employee from disclosing 
this information.40(s79(2)),41 Thus, an employee may obtain a comparator’s 
salary information directly from the comparator.33(p.829),40(s78(1)(b)) However, 
an employee may not disclose information regarding another employee’s 
salary if contractually bound to keep such information confidential.42 
In this respect, the use of the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act43 (PAIA) may be of help in securing this information. Section 63(2)
(f) thereof states that a record may not be refused if the information 
– including remuneration – relates to the official of a private body 
(see Section 34(2)(f) for a similar provision regarding public bodies).43 
An ‘official’ is defined as ‘any person in the employ (permanent or 
temporary, full time or part time) of the public or private body’43(s1). 
Thus, an employee would, in terms of PAIA, be able to obtain the 
remuneration information of another employee upon such request.44(8-106) 
However, as the duty to disclose is subject to other legislation, such as 
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the EEA43(s5), salary information would more likely have to be requested 
from the employer and not from the ECC, which could be prohibited from 
disclosing such information, even in terms of PAIA.
The EC has also found several other barriers to implementing this 
employee right, such as cultural sensitivity against disclosure, the 
administrative and cost burden thereof, and contractual non-disclosure 
clauses.17 It must also be considered that an employee needs to have 
the will and ability, specifically financially, to enforce this right, but 
having the support of a trade union could alleviate the burden of such a 
potentially cumbersome and costly process.25 Despite these issues, the 
legislature should seek to give an employee this right, especially when 
the employee is attempting to prove a claim in terms of Section 6(4) of 
the EEA, in which case the correct comparator is needed.
The third proposed measure is a pay audit at the level of the employer.18 
The key differentiator between an audit and a pay report is the analysis 
of pay gaps found in the former.17 Such analysis45 could enable 
the identification of the problem and the development of targeted 
countermeasures17. The implementation of a pay audit could provide 
useful data, but has the downside of costs in terms of time and expert 
fees to analyse the data and devise measures to close gaps.17 However, 
in order to meet the requirements of fair, responsible and transparent 
remuneration practices, as stipulated in King IV, companies with a 
strong governance ethos would benefit from mandatory pay audits. 
Smaller companies, however, may not have the means with which to 
conduct such audits. Thus, legislated comprehensive pay audits may 
not be ideally suited to the current South African context; however, 
in following the principle of a phased approach, we recommend that 
gender pay audits be legally mandated for large and listed companies 
as an initial step.
The final recommended measure is ensuring that companies discuss, 
as a separate issue, equal gender pay, including pay audits, during 
collective bargaining.17,18 The effectiveness of such a measure depends 
on the development of collective bargaining in a specific sector.17 
The more developed the collective bargaining structures are and the 
more unionised the workforce is, the easier it will be to implement 
this measure.17 In South Africa, collective bargaining almost always 
occurs in the government, resources and industrial sectors, while small 
companies, in general, may have few or no worker representatives.46 
The inclusion of gender pay equality as a collective bargaining issue 
may be legally mandated or a soft law duty on the parties to collective 
bargaining.17 This measure will also be more effective if the state was 
allowed to intervene during the collective bargaining process.17 This 
measure carries the advantage of creating an awareness of gender pay 
issues at a higher sectoral level, but could impose onerous duties on 
the parties to collective bargaining, which may already be burdened 
with setting remuneration for different levels of workers in different 
companies.17 Furthermore, trade unions may view this measure as a 
threat to their autonomy17, especially when considering the Labour 
Relations Act47, wherein no role is identified for the state in collective 
bargaining processes. Due to the conflicts that have arisen around 
collective bargaining in South Africa, we suggest that a soft law 
stipulating that companies discuss equal pay, including pay audits, 
during collective bargaining be introduced into the King codes as a 
matter of good remuneration governance. 
Lastly, an important component of effective transparent mechanisms 
is penalties for non-compliance with stipulations. This component 
necessitates diligent monitoring for non-compliance and enforcement 
of penalties. It is recommended that a financial penalty be levied for 
unjustifiable and stagnant gender pay gaps among the employees 
of the same employer – one that is sufficient to act as a deterrent to 
non-compliance (as a fixed amount per period of non-compliance), as 
is done in Iceland, or be calculated per employee found to have been 
discriminated against, as is done in Belgium. Penalties should thus 
promote compliance with gender pay legislation and transparency 
mechanisms, and ultimately disincentivise discriminatory pay practices.
Conclusion
The World Economic Forum estimates that it may take another 202 years 
before the gender economic gap is closed.48 Embedded in this gap is 
the gender wage gap. South Africa has made great strides towards 
addressing gender inequality, but purposeful momentum towards this 
goal has waned. The proposals in this paper are aimed at reigniting 
debate and motivating action to attain gender wage equality by amending 
policies towards transparency. 
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